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CASE
No.
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vs.

CLIFFORD WEBB,
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CARPENTER PAPER COMp .1-\._NY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff ~ Respondent~
vs.
'VILLIAl\f R. BRANNOCI{, dba
Bill's Dairy Queen,

CASE
No.
/

Defendant~ Appellant~

9627

vs.
CLIFFORD WEBB,
Third-Party Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE1YIENT OF THE CASE
Con1mencing May 15, 1959, and terminating November 23, 1960, the Plaintiff sold and delivered goods
and merchandise consisting of paper and supplies to
Defendant. As of November 23, 1960, and as of the
date of the bringing of this action, the unpaid balance
on the account, exclusive of interest, was $1,022.56.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Case was tried to Judge Marcellus K. Snow, sitting
without a jury. A judgment was rendered in favor of
the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,022.56 with interest
thereon to the date of judgment at the rate of 67o per
annum from the 1st day of January, 1961, together
with Plaintiff's costs, from which judgment the Defendant has appealed.

RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and
judgment in his favor as a matter of law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 15th day of May, 1959, the Defendant met with Mr. E. E. Brown, the general manager of Carpenter Paper Company, in Salt Lake City
and opened up an account in his own name with the
Plaintiff Carpenter Paper Company. Thereafter, and
pursuant to the express copt.ract between the parties,
the Plaintiff delivered goods and. 1nerchandise to the
Defendant, doing business as Bill's Dairy Queen, located at 1521 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Thereafter, a course of dealings existed between the
parties by which orders would be received from the
manager of Bill's Dairy Queen, one Clifford Webb or
other e1nployees; the merchandise would be delivered,
2
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and payments were received on the account periodically.
The amount which remains unpaid on the account for
merchandise sold and delivered is not in dispute; both
parties agreeing that the correct amount is $1,022.56.
Defendant contends that subsequent to October 30,
1959, Mr. Clifford Webb managed the business for
himself, and not for Mr. Brannock. Mr. Brannock,
in his testimony, alleges no notice of the alleged transfer
from Brannock to Webb of the business whatsoever
and Mr. Webb in his testimony denies that any notice
was ever given. Both Mr. E. E. Brown and Mr. Gerald
R. Hyde of the Carpenter Paper Company deny that
they received any notice of any alleged transfer of the
business from William R. Brannock to Clifford Webb.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
"That there was no transfer from Defendant
Brannock to Webb (of) Defendant's business, Bill's
Dairy Queen."
This finding was made by the Court pursuant to
the issues as specified in the pre-trial order contained
on page 16 of the transcript. The first issue there framed
by the Court is (I) Was there transfer from Defendant
to 'V ebb of Defendant's business, Bill's Dairy Queen?
To this the Court has answered in the negative. On this
point the evidence is somewhat in conflict, however, the
3
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Court is justified in its finding that there was no lease
for the fallowing reasons :
1. Mr. Webb in his statement, page 87, line 29 of
the transcript, in answer to the question, "Now did you
ever lease this business from 1\tir. Brannock?" answered
on page 88, line 1~ "Answer. "I never leased it. No."
Now thereafter and continuing in his testimony 'f'rom
line 2 through line 22, page 88, the witness, Mr. Webb,
alleges therein that at some time during 1960 the Defendant Brannock attempted to enter into a lease
arrangement through a written instrument, but that
Mr. Webb refused to sign the same. At no time duririg
the testimony introduced by Defendant was any such
instrument introduced. Furthermore, the findings
were justified by the evidence through the statement of
Mr. Brannock himself, who reported to the Court commencing on page 109, line 29 through line 15 of page
110, wherein it is specified that the telephone listing,
the account with the power con1pany, the sales tax
license, and perhaps the city license all continued in
the name of William R. Brannock. The findings o( th~
Court were proper in that any proposed lease by Mr.
Brannock as testified to by the Messrs. Stanger (an
employee) and Borg (a supplier) was nothing· more
than a sham and not a bona fide lease at all.

2. With respect to the proposition wherein it Is
alleged that the Defendant 'Vebb acknowledged the
debt by having listed the same in the Bankruptcy
Schedule, constittlting page 9 of the transcript (cer4
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tified copy) indicates merely that a case has been filed
in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake
County in the State of Utah, No. 130646, in which the
Defendant Clifford Webb is listed as a Third Party
Defendant. This filing constitutes the entire acknowledgement by Webb in his bankruptcy filing of the
responsibility for the obligation.

POINT II.
"That there was no notice, actual or constructive,
of a contemplated transfer of Defendant's business
from Defendant Brannock to Webb."
1. The second question proposed by the Court

of the pre-trial order was as follows: ( 2) Did Plaintiff
have notice, actual or constructive, of the transfer of
Defendant's business to Webb? In this respect, the
finding of the Court is not entirely consistent with the
question as posed by the pre-trial Court in that the
word "contemplated" has been added therein. For this
purpose we shall limit our arguments only to the
questions of whether or not there was notice, actual
or constructive, of a transfer of the business from
Brannock to Webb if there was in fact any such transfer. As a matter of law, once the Court has found
that ther was no transfer, notice would not be rna terial.
In the interest of time, however, and in order to present
an accurate brief on the evidence which is now before
the Court, and on the assumption that there was in
5
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fact a transfer of the business and a transfer of. the
responsibilities incidental thereto, we shall herein touch
upon the question of notice. The Plaintiff does not
deny, speaking through Mr. Brown, that they are aware
of the type of business which Mr. Brannock operates
in this community; and the evidence .is not in dispute
as to the number of years over which the parties have
done business or of the amount of business done. Statements alleged by counsel for Appellant with respect
to the opening of the business in the early part of 1959,
are not in controversy, that being the time at which the
account was established and one of the primary elements
of Plaintiff's case. Counsel for Appellant in his brief
on page 8 alludes to the fact that Mr. Hyde, the operational manager of the Plaintiff, denied that he knew
of a subsequent transfer of this business in N ov~mber,
1960. Respondent has examined the brief and has been
unable to find any such denial, nor is he able to find
that counsel has referred to on page 50 under line
51 which subsequenHy acknowledges ~nowledge of a
transf.er. It is admitted that thereafter (November,
1960) a clerical error was effected on the books of the
Plaintiff which was im1nediately corrected as soon as notice of the error was brought to the proper part~es. This
touches only upon the amounts which was erroneously
listed on this account and subsequently transferred to
the Hi-Jinks Cmnpany account (the subseq~ent operators of the business.) No claim was made for the amounts·
incurred by the Hi-Jinks Company by the Plaintiff.
at any time.
6
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Plaintiff makes no claim whatsoever for
amounts incurred by the other operators of the Dairy
Queen stores in Salt. Lake City. According to the testimony of Mr. Brown, as well as that of Mr. Brannock,
this is the only store which Mr .. Brannock operated
personally.
2.

3. The other ingredients which Defendant seeks

to sp~cify touching upon the question ~ notice concern itself with the checks, the color of which was subsequently changed (Exhibits D-8, 10, II, 13, 14 and
15) ; upon the fact that Mr. Webb, the manager of
the establishment throughout the entire ~enure of
business, signed the checks subsequent ~o November
1, 1959, and upon the fact that the account was nqt
paid as expeditiously subsequent to November 1, 1959,
as prior thereto. The Court is reminded of the factthat
Mrs. Brannock was able to sign checks on this account
both prior to and subsequent to the alleged transfer
of the business and that the Court is justified in its
findings that neither the change in color of checks, nor
the signature thereon, imparts any reasonable notice,
if notice at all.
,

'

'

Counsel for the Respondent urges the Court that
with respect to Defendant's Exhibit 16, an inter office
memo dictated by Mr. E. E. Brown to a Mr. Mueller
of the executive office that said letter contains some
sort of. declaration to the effect that notice was delivered by Brannock the preceding year, that the Court
should bear in mind that this letter was dictated in
7
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1961, some months after termination of the account,
and then only does the notice refer to something which
Mr. Brannock was saying he had previously said. The
only notice, page 61, line 1 through 13, touches upon
a memo which Mr. Hyde had dictated into the account
(Exhibit D-9) on the day that the attempt was made
to collect the account during the year 1960. At that
time the record indicates Brannock had made a request
that Carpenter Paper "hold up" until he (Brannock)
could start a legal action against some third party. To
counsel this indicates nothing n1ore than an attempt
on the part of Defendant Brannock to confuse the issue
with matters which are not in evidence. Brannock himself was on the stand, had opportunity to testify as to
whether or not he had given notice to Carpenter Paper
or any of its representatives, and chose not to do so for
the obvious reason that no notice was in fact given.
4. Exhibit D-9, touching upon the question of
notice, states merely as follows: "On April 28, 1960,

I called you regarding a past due balance on the
account at that time and I asked for clarification as
to who was running it. You stated that because of your
situation at that time you would be responsible for
all bills incurred, but that your manager Cliff was
running the place." The use of the words "your manager" would not be inconsistent with the fact that he
was "actually running the place" inasmuch as it is
presumed normal that a manager would be in fact
running an establishment. The important phase of these
words appears to be in the question of who was in fact
8
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the proprietor and this seems to flow generally from the
erroneous connotation that the proprietor and manager
must be the.same person. In that letter, dated November
7, 1960, nothing is said whatsoever which would impart
notice from the Defendant to the Plaintiff that there
had actually been a lease and a transfer of responsibility
for charges incurred by said business.

POINT III.
"Defendant William R. Brannock is indebted to
Plaintiff for goods sold and delivered in the amount
of $1,022.56."
Counsel for Appellant now seeks to attack the
ledger which was submitted in evidence even though
the same was introduced without objection (P 29
L 21-22). The account was orignially opened up by
Mr. Brannock himself (P 26 L 22-30). At no time
thereafter, did the Plaintiff !ook to anyone else for
payment other than J\'Ir. Brannock himself. No filing
was made at any time of a certificate to operate under an
assun1ed name with Salt Lake County or with the State
of Utah (P 110 L 13-14). Actually the first page of
the ledger was not missing as specified by counsel
(P 43 L 7-11). At that time Mr. Hyde was merely
going over the ledger sheets which were in his hands
and assumed he did not have the first one even though
subsequently (line 12-14) the same was produced as
page 1 thereof, was received in evidence and is
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

now contained in the record. Thereafter, with reference to Exhibits P-4, P-5 and P-6, the same were
introduced merely for the purpose of building a foundation to the ledger itself. Mr. Hyde testified (P 40
L 17 through P 41 L 23) what must be done prior
to the time that an item is billed on the ledger card.
Mr. Hyde was able to testify as to routine which is followed showing that an item is actually deliver~d and
priced correctly prior to being placed on the ledger.
2. The basis of the action based upon merchandise
or goods sold and delivered had its origin in the old
common law action of Assumpsit. Reading from 4
Am. Jur. P 496, we quote the following:

"Assumpsit has to a considerable extent supplanted the old common law action of account, as
being more simple and less expensive. But there
is a real distinction between assumpsit and account rendered, for one action is based on a duty
to pay, whereas the other is based on a duty to
account. When the promise, express or implied,
involves the duty of direct payment to the plaintiff, assumpsit is the proper form of action;
where the duty is not direct, but one of outlay
in the performance of a trust or business which
from its nature requires an exhibit of the sums
expended before the direct duty can arise, the
legal requirement is to render an account, and
assumpsit will not lie until the balance is ascertained.''
In this case we have not alleged that any of these goods
were actually and specifically ordered by Mr. Brannock. Generally speaking, the Plaintiff assumes that
10
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the orders were turned in by Mr. Webb, the manager
of the establishment for Mr. Brannock throughout
this entire period of time, but they might have been
subn1itted by other persons. With respect to delivery,
the Plaintiff does not maintain that these items were actually delivered to Mr. Brannock personally. There
is actual privity between the parties in that the account
was established by lVIr. Brannock himself. Thereafter
the account was paid by checks drawn on the account
of Bill's Dairy Queen, a proprietorship owned and
operated by Mr. Brannock. Nothing was done in the
course of dealing between the parties to change the
arrangement which was established originally. Items
delivered prior to November 1, 1959, although not
delivered to Mr. Brannock personally, were paid for
by Mr. Brannock. Items delivered subsequent thereto
were delivered in the same course and according to
the same arrangement as prior thereto and checks
were received in payment therefor on checks drawn
under the name and account of "Bill's Dairy Queen".
The business records which were introduced by the
Plaintiff were for the purpose of indicating that the
goods were actually sold and delivered to the establishment; that the price therefor was in accordance with
the general terms and agreements of the parties, and
that there remains unpaid on the goods sold and delivered the amount of $1,022.56.

11
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POINT IV.
"The Court erred in admitting Exhibit P-1, and
Exhibits P-4, P-5, and P-6 and (incompetent to justify
the conclusion or judgment)."
The point brought up by the Appellant herein
appears to be in two parts, namely:
1. The error in admission of the documents and
2. The allegation that the same are incompetent
to justify judgment.

With respect to the former we urge the Court
herein that the same were admitted without objection
in each instance, and that the same cannot be objected
to upon appeal. Nevertheless, we feel these exhibits are competent and material. Arguments on
this point have heretofore been presented. With respect to the competency of the same to justify the
judgment we have the following:
1. The establishment of the account by Brannock.

2. The course of dealing between the parties from

May 15, 1959, through October 30, 1959.
3. The continued course of orders and deliveries
subsequent thereto to the termination of the account
in October of 1960.
4. The introduction of the ledger showing the
balance to be $1,022.56 on the said account.
5. The introduction of P-4 which indicates the type
of orders used by the company.
12
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6. The introduction of Exhibits P-5 and P-6,
which trace one particula1:' order from the time it is
ordered until it appears on the ledger and a statement
by :\Ir. Hyde (P 41 L 15) in which he states that each
and every entry on the ledger ( P 41 L 6 through 9)
is supported by background information identical with
that on the' item introduced.
Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Hyde testified as to
the accuracy of Exhibit P-1. Mr. Brown is the general
manager and Mr. Hyde is the credit manager under
whose direction the ledger was kept in the regular
course of business.

CONCLUSION
. A good deal of what counsel for Appellant discusses in his brief touches upon the accuracy of the
account. This· matter is actually discussed at the time
of pre-trial and no question whatsoever is raised as
to the accuracy of the balance due. The issues resolved
at the pre-trial were only three:
1. "Was there a transfer of the business?"
2. "Did the Plaintiff have notice, actual or con-

structive, of the transfer of the business?" and
3. "Even though there was a transfer to Webb and

notice thereof to the Plaintiff, did the Defendant promise to pay for subsequent deliveries to Webb in reliance
upon which the Plaintiff made the subsequent deliveries?"
13
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We have touched upon the first two points and very
little is in evidence with respect to the third. An issue
of law was raised at the pre-trial and disposed of as
follows:
1. The Court rules in favor of the Plaintiff that if

it should be agreed that the facts would show without
dispute that after a course of dealing with Plaintiff,
Defendant dropped out of the business and substituted
Webb in his place but gave no notice of the change,
either actual or constructive to Plaintiff; that the
Plaintiff relying on Defendant's credit, continued to
make the sales and deliveries to Bill's Dairy Queen.
From the evidence as discussed herein, the Court
has ruled that there was actually no transfer or lease
of the business from the Defendant to Mr. Webb.
Following thereafter the Court concludes that there
was no notice actual or constructive of the transfer
of the business. In view of these facts and in accordance
with the trial court, it is respectfully urged your HonorCourt that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
The Appellant does not urge the Court to make a
change in the findings as a matter of fact, but only urges
that change be made as a matter of law. \Ve see no
justification for his contentions.
Respectfully submitted,
L. M. HAYNIE
Attorney for Respondent
14
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